Skepticism And Qabalah

On Certainty and Radical Doubt Certainty In our modern world we have something that our forefathers in the ancient world did not have, and upon which all of modern thought, all of our science and our technological innovation, can be said to have been built. That one thing that has shaped the way that we think and behave, pushed us onwards and upwards to such great heights, and spread its influence into almost every area of our lives is certainty. In the old world there were great thinkers, philosophers, inventors and more whose minds gave birth to profound ideas and whose insights were an invaluable resource for the cultures in which they lived. But for the most part human knowledge consisted of speculation. People could develop theories and philosophies or have revelatory experiences, some of which would be compelling and influential, and some of which would not. But there was no way to tell which ones were correct, or to what degree they were correct, and so it was largely a matter of preference which ones you chose to believe. And then something happened which changed all of that, offering humanity a way to sort the wheat from the Chaff and create a body of knowledge of which we could be completely certain. That something was the insight of the French philosopher Rene Descartes. Doubt Descartes set out to find certainty in his knowledge of the world through his philosophical method of `radical doubt’. This meant that he set out to eradicate everything which could possibly be doubted in any way, and to continue until he was left with only those things which were self-evidently true and could not, therefore, be doubted. In one part of his work on this method, famously associated with the phrase `I think therefore I am’, Descartes saw that the only thing of which he could truly be certain was his own existence. But he also observed a world around himself and wished to find some certain knowledge about its nature, as well as about his own existence. This led him to formulate what came to be known as the `Cartesian Dualism’ ­ the idea that mind and matter are wholly distinct things and that no part of either one shares in the nature of the other. The Cartesian dualism, and the work of those who built upon it, went on to form the foundations of modern science and of our whole modern way of thinking about the world we live in. It is through this explicit distinction between mind and matter that all personal prejudices, preferences and foibles could be eliminated from the body of human knowledge, leaving only that which can be derived directly from our observation of the material world itself and of which we can therefore be certain. By removing all those things which issue from the subject of knowledge ­ the mind of the enquirer themselves ­ and leaving yourself with only those facts which are observed to be true in the object of knowledge ­ the material world ­ you obtain `objective’ knowledge, and this is the foundation stone of science. This desire for certainty, and the skepticism through which it is attained, have always been a strong part of the way that I see the world and approach trying to understand it. Although I have for many years been fascinated by religion and spirituality, and drawn to esoteric theologies and spiritual philosophies of all kinds, I have never felt comfortable with abandoning this skepticism and this need for certainty and so have remained steadfastly agnostic . But yet I do not for a moment accept that Descartes fully explored the potential of his method of radical doubt, and nor do I think that modern science, for all its wonders and achievements, is so singular as to be the only system which can be built upon it. Indeed, I have harboured a suspicion for many years that it may be possible to create a religion or system of spiritual philosophy of some kind which is based wholly on reason, in which could be found a knowledge and understanding of the world and of the lives we all live, and of which we could be certain. A New Duality But before I begin to express my own thoughts on this matter I would like to further develop this idea of radical doubt by looking at the work of another famous philosopher ­ Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer began with Descartes first insight – that his own thoughts and perceptions were the only thing which he truly could not doubt. But Schopenhauer, rather than being content with this, wanted to take a strict application of radical doubt to its furthest conclusion and to rely on it completely in creating his new philosophy. What he showed was that if one is to follow the method of radical doubt to its logical conclusion then one must doubt the very existence of a material world itself, and in so doing he came to a somewhat refined version of the old Cartesian duality. As Schopenhauer states in the first chapter of his book `The World as Will and Representation’, we do not know a sun and an earth “but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth”. What he is saying here is that there is no evidence, nor could there ever be any evidence, that the world exists separately and independently of our perceptions of it. “Therefore no truth is more certain, more independent of others, and less in need of proof than this, namely that everything that exists for knowledge, and hence the whole of this world, is only object in relation to the subject, perception of the perceiver, in a word, representation.” This is of course a radical thought, that there simply is no material world in the way that we usually conceive of it. But yet it is not inconsistent with modern quantum physics, which has found repeatedly that at the fundamental level of sub-atomic particles things exist as smeared out waves of probability until the act of observation itself causes these waves to `collapse’ into particles with finite qualities. It is also the only logical conclusion of a strict and unyielding application of the method of radical doubt. If we are to build a system of knowledge upon only that of which we can be certain, removing all of those ideas which arise in our own minds and which, however compelling, cannot be demonstrated to be true through direct experience and which we cannot therefore be certain of, then this concept of a material universe existing independently of our perceptions of it ­ which not one of us throughout history has experienced nor ever could hope to experience ­ must be put aside. We are therefore left with 2 fundamental aspects of reality of whose existence we can be certain and which must form the foundations of our knowledge and understanding ­ the subject and the object of knowledge and perception. It is this division of the world into subject and object which is the refinement of the Cartesian duality of mind and matter which I mentioned earlier. The subject, which is “that which knows all things and is known by none”, that which perceives but cannot be perceived, corresponds to the mind, whereas the object, or that which is known, clearly corresponds to matter. And in truth this really is a minor refinement, simply removing the unwarranted assumption that the mind is always the subject, and that the object is always and only the material world. Nor should you think that either Schopenhauer or I are trying to tell you here that the world does not exist as a solid and independent thing, because that is not the case. Rather, in the absence of any evidence either way, we are saying that such a thing cannot properly play a part in any objective body of knowledge, and must be put to one side. Beyond Belief It is upon this strict application of radical doubt, rather than the looser scientific one, that I believe a new way of understanding our universe and our existence within it may be built. But the understanding that I myself have come to, and which I am presenting here, is not entirely new. It is a reformulation of a much older system, whose origins are lost in the sands of time, and which you most certainly know from the title of this book, is called Qabalah. Although I myself have studied Qabalah on its own terms, as it presents itself, and found a great deal of wisdom and understanding within it, the one thing that I do not want to do in this book, that I want to avoid at all costs, is to simply repeat the teachings of the Qabalah as they are found in a thousand other places and then simply append some explanation or justification to suggest why I think it is true. Rather, what I would like to do, and which I dearly hope I will succeed in doing, is to show how many of the central truths that I found in Qabalah can be reached independently and by skeptical reason alone, beginning from the method of radical doubt and the certainties which it reveals. Insofar as I discuss the Qabalah at all, I hope only to highlight the parallels between it and the reasoned and logical ideas that I will present here, and to show how the later fits into the system of classification provided by the former. And nor do I want you to assume that I am in any way a `believer’ in Qabalah, or that I am promoting the idea that the Qabalah is divinely inspired and wholly true in all of its parts. That would be to miss the whole point of this book, as the one thing that I have tried to do throughout is to put aside unquestioning believe, and even beyond this, to put aside the need for such a belief. So, having stated my intentions and hopefully wetted your appetite for what is to come, the next stage is to look in more detail at the 2 fundamental categories of existence which we have already identified, namely the subject and the object, and any properties which they may be said to possess. Definitions The first thing to make clear is that, as already stated, the subject is always `that which knows’ and cannot, therefore, be known itself. This highlights the importance of making the distinction between the subject and the mind, as the mind can itself be known and insofar as this is the case it ceases to be the subject of knowledge and becomes the object of knowledge. Likewise, by definition, the object cannot itself know, but is always only that which is known. This is not to say that we cannot conceive of anything which can both know and be known, but simply that at the most fundamental level, and by this I mean the most universal level which applies most consistently to all things, the whole of our experience can be divided into these two classes whose nature is wholly distinct one from the other, but whose existence is nevertheless dependent on each other (because you can’t have a subject, or a knower, without an object, or something to know). And this being the case, and if the words `subject’ and `object’ are to be used within the context of this book purely as technical terms referring to this universal division of all things, then any new things which should arise which display aspects of both should not be described as both subject and object, but rather given their own name according to their nature and said to contain within that nature two distinct parts. So, for example, water contains both hydrogen and oxygen, but it is not a single thing which can be said to be both hydrogen and oxygen simultaneously, but rather it is a new composite thing which contains them both but is in itself neither one. Here is what Schopenhauer says about the subject and the object in the second chapter of `The World As Will And Representation’: “The one half is the object, whose forms are space and time, and through these plurality. But the other half, the subject, does not lie in space and time, for it is whole and undivided in every representing being” This is a very interesting and important statement. Space is a description of the separation of objects, and time a description of the relative separation of objects from one moment to the next (leaving aside the thorny issue of what a moment might be!). Both of these things therefore refer only to the universe as object, and not to the subject. In the context of the subject, which shares nothing of the nature of the object, terms such as space and time which describe the relationships between object simply have no relevance. The subject can therefore be thought of as both eternal and infinite, although not in the sense that we would usually understand those terms. One might commonly think of eternal as meaning `existing for all time’ and infinite as meaning `spanning all of space’ ­ in other words without end in time and space. However if you thinking of them instead as meaning `unbounded by the limitations of time’, and `unbounded by spacial limitations’, then you can see that something which exists outside of time and space can be said to be both eternal and infinite as they are without either beginning or end in time and space. The Crown and The Kindgom At this stage we can begin to see the similarities between the ideas being outlined here and the teachings of Qabalah. For those of you who aren’t familiar with Qabalah it is based in a large part around a glyph called the `Tree of Life’. This glyph is composed of 10 spheres and 22 connecting paths, which are said to be a pictorial representation of God, the universe and mankind alike. There is also an 11 sphere (Daath), which is called `the sphere which is not a sphere’ and is drawn with broken lines to show that it is not one of the 10 true spheres, which is associated with knowledge. At the top of the Tree of Life the highest of the 10 spheres, representing highest and most rarified aspect of ourselves and of the body of God is called Kether, the crown. Kether is described as infinite and unknowable, as the pure and eternal spiritual source of existence, and as pure undifferentiated being. It is singular and as the first sphere is explicitly linked to the number 1 in the sacred geometry and mathematics which is an important part of Qabalah, and it is one of 3 spheres which are described as being `above the abyss’, meaning that they are purely spiritual and are not directly manifest in the material world. Each of the 10 spheres is associated with a name of God, and for Kether this is AHYH (often pronounced Eheyeh) which is sometimes translated as `I will be’ and sometimes as `I Am’. As you can see there are already some striking similarities between Schopenhauer’s subject and the sphere of Kether. Both are conceived as being infinite and eternal. Both are in themselves unknowable (the subject, remember, is always the knower and cannot by definition ever itself be known). Both are described as `whole and undivided’, as they are not a part of the plurality of the material world. Both are defined explicitly as being wholly separate from the material world. The subject is the ground of our experience of our own existence – pure conscious awareness itself divorced from the object of that awareness – and Kether, the spiritual ground or source of existence, is known by the name `I Am’, which is sometimes explained as meaning existence before it is limited or defined by the second half of the sentence `I am this’, or I am that’. Even the archangel association with Kether, who is named Metatron and is sometimes described as the scribe of God who maintains the eternal archives of the Lord, points to the same nature ­ that of the subject of knowledge. At the other end of the Tree is the tenth sphere, which is called Malkuth and is associated with the physical body and with material existence. As such it is also a parallel of the other half of our duality, the object of knowledge. And the parallels are not even limited to the descriptions of the 2 spheres on their own. It can also be seen in an often repeated saying in Qabalah that `Kether is in Malkuth, and Malkuth is in Kether’, that the two are dependent on each other, contained in each other and issue from each other. This is also an accurate description of the relationship between the subject, which cannot exist alone and implies in its own nature the necessity of its counterpart, and the object. An Introduction To Will Leaving aside the Qabalah for the moment we can return to the method of radical doubt and the certainties that can be obtained through its application. So far we have identified 2 aspects of our existence, but are there any others of which we can be completely certain? Well to begin with we can say with certainty that there must be some other element in addition to the subject and the object, because if there were only the subject and the object then, as Schopenhauer says, “it (the world) would pass by us like an empty dream, or a ghostly vision not worth our consideration”. In other words, it would have no meaning for us, it would simply be there to be seen but without any value or significance. But “In fact, the meaning that I am looking for of the world that stands before me simply as my representation, or the transition from it as mere representation of the knowing subject to whatever it may be besides this, could never be found if the investigator himself were nothing more than the purely knowing subject (a winged cherub without a body). But he himself is rooted in that world; and thus he finds himself in it as an individual, in other words, his knowledge, which is the conditional supporter of the world as representation, is nevertheless given entirely through the medium of a body, and the affectations of this body are, as we have shown, the starting-point for the understanding in its perception of this world. For the purely knowing subject as such, this body is a representation like any other, an object among objects. Its movements and action are so far known to him in just the same way as the changes of all other objects of perception; and they would be equally strange and incomprehensible to him, if their meaning were not unraveled for him in an entirely different way. Otherwise, he would see his conduct follow on presented motives with the constancy of a law of nature, just as the changes of other objects follow upon causes, stimuli, and motives. But he would be no nearer to understanding the influence of the motives than he is to understanding the connection with its cause of any other effect that appears before him. He would then also call the inner, to him incomprehensible, nature of those manifestations and actions of his body a force, a quality, or a character, just as he pleased, but he would have no further insight into it. All this, however, is not the case; on the contrary, the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge appearing as individual, and this answer is given in the word Will.” I know that was rather a long quote from Schopenhauer, but it is a crucial point that I think he makes very well. So know we can say there are three things of which we can be certain ­ that the subject of knowledge exists, that the object of knowledge exists, and that there is some third thing through which the changes occurring in the world of objects are bestowed with meaning and significance, and which we here identify using the term Will. It must be kept in mind, however, that this term Will, for which I use Schopenhauer’s capitalization, is not the same as the commonly used term `will’, but rather should be thought of as a technical term whose meaning is limited to that which is defined here. And that definition is to be seen as broader than the common usage which generally means either desire or the ability to choose between competing options according to that desire. So far we have defined the Will only as that which imbues the world with meaning and significance, and one of three fundamental categories of existence as we experience it. We have also associated it with our existence as individuals who possess a body which is itself a focal point of this Will. But we can also see that the concept of Will provides a bridge between the subject and object in ways other than simply just the attribution of meaning. This is because whereas subject and object are pure distinct from one another and share no part of their natures, the Will in some way combines the two as it contains them both within itself. The will must know, in order to divine the significance of things for the subject and modify itself accordingly, but it must also belong to the object, as otherwise it would not be able to exert itself in the world of objects to affect changes and to animate the body, just as the subject itself cannot alter the world of objects, only support its existence by providing the necessary counterpoint. This dual nature of the Will, containing aspects of both the subject and the object of knowledge, also allows us to answer a difficult question, namely why it is that an infinite and eternal subject should be so finite and limited within our actual experience of it. After all the subject itself, as it has already been described as both singular and unbounded, and must therefore touch equally at every point of the world as object. But yet although we experience the existence of the subject, we experience it in a limited fashion; we are not aware of the whole universe simultaneously, only a very small part of it associated with our physical form. By suggesting that our nature is that of will, which unites the object and its corresponding subject, this is no longer such a problem. An Introduction to Understanding And this brings us to the nest thing that I would like to look at, namely the correspondence between the individual object and its subject: “As the object in general exists only for the subject as the representation thereof, so does every special class of representations exist only for an equally special disposition in the subject, which is called a faculty of knowledge. The subjective correlative of time and space in themselves, as empty forms, was called by Kant pure sensibility, and this expression may be retained, as Kant was the pioneer here, although it is not quite suitable; for sensibility presupposes matter. The subjective correlative of matter or of causality, for the two are one and the same, is the understanding, and it is nothing more than this. To know causality is the sole function of the understanding, its only power, and it is a great power embracing much, manifold in its application, and yet unmistakable in its identity throughout all its manifestations. Conversely, all causality, hence all matter, and consequently the whole of reality, is only for the understanding, through the understanding, in the understanding. The first, simplest, ever present manifestation of understanding is perception of the actual world.” This idea that every object, and every class or `disposition’ of object, has a corresponding disposition within the subject should not be taken as a contradiction of the earlier statements that the subject is singular and undifferentiated, as we are here talking about the subject as it appears from the perspective of the object, rather than as it exists in its own nature. The Trinity Above The Abyss At this point it is worth returning briefly to Qabalah. Along with Kether there are said to be two other spheres which exist above the abyss and comprise the trinity of purely spiritual existence. These are Chokmah and Binah, which are often named in English as `Will’ and `Understanding’. Chokmah And The Nature Of Will If we look more closely at this idea of Will that we have been developing an interesting question arises. Clearly our own will resides within, and is inextricably linked to, our bodies. But yet through our senses we can reach out beyond our bodies and perceive objects which exist beyond and outside of ours own body. So what of these? Is there something special about the human body which distinguishes it from all other objects and gives rise to this thing called Will which cannot be found anywhere else? If we are to follow the method that I outlined in the first chapter, and hold onto only that of which we can be certain casting aside all untested and uncertain assumptions, then we cannot assume that the human body possesses this quality above all other objects. The same, of course, might apply equally to the quality of possessing a subject, a faculty of knowledge, but this raises some complex issues which are addressed later. For this chapter I want to look only at the Will. If we cling to the common idea of will, as the ability to choose, this idea of all things having a Will seems to be absurd. A rock cannot choose to be anything other than a rock, and nor can a cloud choose in which direction it travels across the sky. But there is another way of approaching the nature of Will, simply as the inner nature of things rather than the act of choosing, which allows us to get around this problem. It seems that it is this inner nature which Schopenhauer meant when he talked about the Will, as this rather grandiose paragraph suggests: “Here we already see that we cannot get at the inner nature of things from without. However much we may investigate, we obtain nothing but images and names. We are like a man who goes round a castle, looking in vain for an entrance, and sometimes sketching the facades. Yet this is the path that all philosophers before me have followed”. Although Schopenhauer is perhaps being a bit arrogant in suggesting that he is the first to ever penetrate to this inner nature of things with his philosophy, there is nevertheless a very important distinction to be made between this approach to the nature of things and the common way of studying and describing things. It is certainly true that science has nothing to say about what things actually are ­ about their inner nature in themselves. Science describes things only in terms of their behavior and their relationships to other things: the way they react with other substances, the way light reflects off them, their relative special dimensions, way they move, and so on. The infamous occultist Aleister Crowley highlighted the limitations of this method in his essay `What is a “Number”? Or A “Symbol”?’ in which he says: “We are thus forced to the conclusion that all investigation may be stigmatized as obscurum per obscurius. Logically, our position is even worse. We define A as BC, where B is DE and C is FG. Not only does the process increase the number of unknown quantities in Geometrical progression at every step, but we must ultimately arrive at a point where the definition of Z involves the term A. Not only is all argument confined within a vicious circle, but so is the definition of the terms on which any argument must be based.” So taking the Will to refer to the inner nature of things you can see that if the inner nature of a rock is the Will to be a rock, then of course it cannot choose to be anything other than itself, because its inner nature, its Will, is singular; it simply does to possess any capacity to Will anything other than to be a rock. To see the Will as this inner nature is also the simplest way of explaining what it is, without the need for postulating some extra thing in addition to the material, and is therefore the best explanation according to our method. It also seems to accord with the descriptions of Chokmah in the Qabalah. Chockmah is the sphere of the father and of the creative impulse, the seed which grows into the material world. And this idea of Will as the inner nature of things also seems to describe that mysterious impulse which causes things to exist; at its most basic level it is simply this: the will to exist, the creative impulse, the seed from which the object with its physical form and its own manner of interaction with its environment arises. Further considerations on the nature of Will involve some rather complex issue, and so I should like to return to it later, after certain others things have been made clear. Binah And The Nature of Understanding As with the Will we must think of the understanding here in much broader terms than the word is usually used to convey. In the context of this book understanding does not mean comprehension, but rather a direct perception, either of the material world directly, of our own thoughts, or of the principles and laws of nature. And this is an important thing to consider. We have seen that the understanding is to be seen as the subjective (i.e. belonging to the subject) correlative of those things which exist in the world of objects. But this leads us to ask: what is an object? Is a chair on object? Or are the carbon atoms within it objects? Are the electrons and protons? Are all of them objects in their own right? We must ask ourselves these questions and more if we are to understand the nature of the subject, and in what forms it can be said to exist. As a starting point in answering these questions it is useful to draw on the small pool of answers that we have already identified. We have already identified the Will as being the inner nature of things, and it is a logical necessity that all things must have an inner nature, an existence within themselves beyond their relationships with other things. Another way to state this is that all things, and hence all objects as that is truly what is referred to here by the word `things’, must have a Will. And so the existence of the understanding, and the form that it takes, is therefore intimately linked to the Will. Unfortunately, as you may have guessed, this means that we must return to this discussion later as well, when we have the necessary conceptual tools. For the moment, however, we may spare a thought to ponder the similarities between the understanding as it is described here, and the understanding of Binah, with its archangelic order of the Thrones, which support the world and the spiritual beings, the pure abstract truths, which define the universe. As the lowest of the 3 spheres of the trinity above the abyss Binah is said to be the beginning of plurality, the place in which the plurality of material existence arises, and indeed the same can be said for the understanding which breaks the singularity of the subject and defines the plurality of the world of objects. NB / extrapolation of will must also apply to the subject, must be addressed in relation to quantum physics reference earlier ­ the subject appears only to exist within complex or organized systems (systems with a will, which resist entropy, not subatomic particles. NB / free will question addressed in Tipareth and the manifest self, the only choice being to not follow one’s true will, being one’s true nature, due to contradictions etc arising from a lack of unity. On The Nature Of Intelligence If we want to explore the common ground between Will and understanding, the point at which the two meet and where we might be able to gain some insight into the way that they relate to each other and therefore their own characteristics, then its seems to me that the most logical place to start is to look at the nature of intelligence. That is because intelligence itself seems to combine both will and understanding ­ a perception and awareness of the world and a will to change it. Of course the study of intelligence is a very broad topic, and one that cannot be approached in any general or comprehensive manner here. But fortunately there is only one area of this field that we really need to look at for our purposes here, and that is simply to ask ourselves where it can be found. If intelligence is some peculiarly human thing, which arises in some mysterious way through the complexities of the human organism, and if it can be found nowhere else in the world, then it would seem to be a dead end which cannot help us. But if, on the other hand, intelligence is more universal than this, and if in fact it arises universally and inevitably where the Will and the understanding come together, then it may prove to be a more fruitful line of enquiry. , then start blogging!